Spring 2025
ECON 206 001 - LEC 001
Formerly 209B
Mechanism Design and Agency Theory
Quitze Valenzuela-Stookey
Class #:26657
Units: 3
Instruction Mode:
In-Person Instruction
Offered through
Economics
Current Enrollment
Total Open Seats:
6
Enrolled: 9
Waitlisted: 0
Capacity: 15
Waitlist Max: 5
No Reserved Seats
Hours & Workload
7 hours of outside work hours per week, and 2 hours of instructor presentation of course materials per week.
Other classes by Quitze Valenzuela-Stookey
Course Catalog Description
This course will study the optimal design of mechanisms in the presence of incomplete information and imperfect observability. The course will begin with the "classic" principal-agent problem and will then develop its applications to the "implicit contracts" theory of agency and to the choice of government policies for regulated industries. The second half of the course will treat the design of auctions, regulation with costly or imperfect monitoring, mechanism design with limited contracts.
Rules & Requirements
Repeat Rules
Course is not repeatable for credit.
Reserved Seats
Current Enrollment
No Reserved Seats
Textbooks & Materials
See class syllabus or https://calstudentstore.berkeley.edu/textbooks for the most current information.
Guide to Open, Free, & Affordable Course Materials
Associated Sections
None